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COMMENTS
“CATCH” AND RELEASE: PROCEDURAL
UNFAIRNESS ON PRIMETIME TELEVISION
AND THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF
THE LAW
Thomas Gaeta∗
Programs such as NBC’s Dateline: To Catch a Predator illustrate the
possible pitfalls of law enforcement interactions with media. To Catch a
Predator is rife with procedural deficiencies and often appears to place the
goal of increased ratings ahead of appropriate law enforcement
procedures. Recent research in the field of social psychology has revealed
that the perception of the law and law enforcement as legitimate can have
an important effect on public compliance with the law. When the police
take part in procedurally flawed media events, they may do more harm than
good—sincere efforts to inform the public about law enforcement actions
may ultimately erode the perception of police legitimacy and result in
increased criminality. As such, it is incumbent on law enforcement to wrest
control of its media interactions and insist that proper police procedures be
observed on camera and off.

I. INTRODUCTION
In a normal, unidentified neighborhood, a nondescript car pulls up to
an average house, and television ratings ensue. The car’s occupant is
∗
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waved into the house by a young woman, with whom he believes he has
been corresponding for quite some time. The young woman has told him
she is underage, and he has made the trip to visit her for sex. Upon entry,
he is greeted not with her embrace, but with a steely-eyed reporter who
grills him about his behavior before the world. Under the guise of assisting
law enforcement and exposing men who deserve the public’s scorn,
Dateline: To Catch a Predator has caught yet another. After his
humiliation, the man leaves the house only to be tackled by waiting police.
The cameras catch it all so that, months later, a heavily edited segment may
be aired on national television. The same pattern, with minor changes to
give the program flavor, repeats itself time and time again.
This Comment explores possible consequences of this public shaming
under color of law. Current scholarship in social psychology illustrates a
need for law enforcement to be perceived as legitimate in order to increase
public cooperation with the law.1 This public perception of legitimacy is
informed in large part by perceptions of procedural fairness2 that, in turn,
are influenced by comparisons of observed outcomes with moral mandates.3
A program such as To Catch a Predator, by presenting morally charged
antagonists in a format that often precludes criminal prosecution, may result
in diminished perceptions of law enforcement legitimacy. Both police and
local prosecutors should consider this possibility when deciding whether
and under what terms to participate in such programs.
Part II of this Comment highlights the procedural problems in To
Catch a Predator, as well as legal issues arising in stings, generally. Part
III reviews some of the social psychological literature on the perception of
legitimacy, procedural fairness, and compliance with legal authority.
Finally, Part IV examines law enforcement and media interactions in light
of this social psychological research and sets out a possible solution for law
enforcers who desire to participate in such programs: by maintaining
control over the procedures used by media agents, law enforcers can help
ensure that the programs ultimately aired present a fair view of legal
procedures.

1

See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3-4 (1990).
See, e.g., Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 519 (2003);
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 375, 382 (2006).
3
Linda J. Skitka & David A. Houston, When Due Process Is of No Consequence: Moral
Mandates and Presumed Defendant Guilt or Innocence, 14 SOC. JUST. RES. 305, 307 (2001);
Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral Conviction, 2 ANALYSES SOC.
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37 (2002).
2
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II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY AND FORMAT OF TO CATCH A PREDATOR

Since 2004, NBC and MSNBC have aired To Catch a Predator on the
televised newsmagazine, Dateline NBC (Dateline).4 This segment, initially
a one-off segment on an otherwise unrelated weekly program, received such
a large audience response that it was quickly expanded into a regular feature
on Dateline and was re-run frequently on MSNBC.5 The Dateline episodes
with To Catch a Predator segments averaged seven million viewers, 13%
more viewers than of episodes aired during the same period that focused on
other content.6
Each To Catch a Predator segment involves Chris Hansen, a Dateline
reporter and producer, working alongside Perverted Justice, a private
investigative group, and often local law enforcement to run a sting against
alleged sexual predators.7 This sting is captured for the audience,
ostensibly from inception to arrest, and is usually prefaced by narration
from Hansen about the dangers of online sexual predation.8 The program
alleges that the sting’s targets, alleged sexual predators,9 initiate contact and
solicit sexual liaisons with Perverted Justice volunteers posing online as
minors.10 These predators are given the address of the show’s sting house
for a planned sexual encounter with the volunteer, still posing as a minor,
and a time at which to arrive.11 Upon arrival, the predators are either
invited in by a seemingly underage actor playing the role of the minor the
predators had contacted or enter without invitation as directed in their

4

Dateline NBC: To Catch a Predator was initially titled Dangerous Web during the
segment’s first airing in September 2004. Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web (NBC television
broadcast Sept. 24, 2004). This Comment will refer to all segments using the same format as
To Catch a Predator.
5
Brian Stelter, ‘To Catch a Predator’ Is Falling Prey to Advertisers’ Sensibilities, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/business/
media/27predator.html.
6
Id.
7
Beginning with the third installment, each episode of To Catch a Predator has involved
police. Dateline NBC: To Catch a Predator III (NBC television broadcast Feb. 3, 2006).
8
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4. In the first broadcast, Hansen
referred to a study by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, stating “[o]ne
in five children online in this country has been approached by adults looking for sex.” Id.
9
This Comment hereafter generally refers to all the targets of the show as “predators.”
This is not meant to imply that all such individuals are guilty of any crimes but simply
echoes the language used in To Catch a Predator.
10
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4.
11
See, e.g., id.
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online chat sessions.12 Rather than finding an underage sexual partner, the
predators are confronted by Chris Hansen.13
These confrontations are recorded by cameras hidden in the sting
house, allowing Hansen to document them for later airings.14 In each
instance, Hansen has printouts of the predator’s chat sessions with the
Perverted Justice volunteer in hand and demands an explanation from the
predator as to his15 intentions.16 In the early segments, the predators
generally did not recognize Hansen as a journalist, and he opted not to
identify himself or the program until several minutes into his conversation
with the predator.17 Once identified, a camera crew emerges, and the
predator is informed that his attempted illegal liaison with a minor will be
aired on national television.18 At the conclusion of Hansen’s interviews, the
predator is allowed to leave the sting house, humiliated.19 At this point in
later segments, local police officers arrest the predator in front of Dateline’s
cameras.20
After the sting, the segment concludes with an epilogue detailing the
legal travails of the predators, as well as their humiliation and suffering due
to extra-legal social pressures.21 If a predator does not show up at the sting
house, the program sometimes approaches him at his home or place of work
to confront him with evidence of his transgressions.22 In most cases, such
confrontations are not accompanied by law enforcement.23
12

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
14
See, e.g., id.
15
Without exception, the predators “caught” in the sting have been male. No
explanation of this phenomenon has been offered by the program.
16
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4.
17
Hansen stated in an interview supporting the airing of the first segment that “[a]t first
[the target] seems to think I’m a police officer,” and later that, “[i]t seems clear [the target]
thinks he’s been caught in a police sting.” Today (NBC television broadcast Sept. 24, 2004).
18
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4.
19
See, e.g., id.
20
In the first two To Catch a Predator segments, there was no law enforcement
involvement. See, e.g., id. Beginning with the third segment and continuing throughout the
remainder of the series, police were involved in the stings. See, e.g., Dateline NBC: To
Catch a Predator III, supra note 7.
21
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4.
22
See, e.g., id. Hansen approached Ryan Hogan, a New York City fire fighter, outside
the firehouse at which he worked to confront him about his online activities. Id. In a later
segment, Hansen reported that Hogan was fired from his job with the fire department.
Dateline NBC: Fates of Men Caught in Previous Internet Sexual Predator Sting Operations
(NBC television broadcast May 24, 2005).
23
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4. In some instances, law
enforcement does accompany Hansen to the target’s home. See, e.g., Dateline: To Catch a
Predator (NBC television broadcast Feb. 20, 2007).
13
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B. PERVERTED JUSTICE

Unlike many stings operated solely by law enforcement, To Catch a
Predator uses volunteers from Perverted Justice in lieu of trained law
enforcement officers to lure predators to the sting location.24 Perverted
Justice Foundation Incorporated, a private, nonprofit group founded in 2003
by Xavier Von Erck, is dedicated to the elimination of the threat of online
sexual predation.25 The group regularly uses volunteers in conducting its
own stings, as it does in the To Catch a Predator stings, to pose as underage
individuals and engage in sexual conversations with possible online
predators.26 Once they believe they have gathered evidence of a crime,
Perverted Justice turns over all chat logs to law enforcement officials who
then have the option of pursuing criminal charges against the alleged
predator.27 In the case of Dateline’s stings, Perverted Justice shares chat
logs with the program and police working with the program.28 When
participating in the show, Perverted Justice volunteers are also responsible
for encouraging predators to meet at designated times and places after the
predators initiate inappropriate contact.29
In addition to stings, the Perverted Justice Foundation has branched
out into other areas of online solicitation prevention.30 These projects
include, for example, a concerted effort of volunteers to pressure corporate
interests into making online solicitation of minors more difficult,31
providing advice and aid to individuals victimized online,32 and publicizing
the identities of individuals caught by Perverted Justice’s extra-legal sting
operations.33 While these efforts are no doubt admirable, questions linger
24

See, e.g., Dateline NBC: Dangerous Web, supra note 4.
Perverted Justice Foundation Incorporated, About Us, http://www.pjfi.org/?pg=about
(last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
26
Perverted-Justice.com, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pervertedjustice.com/index.php?pg=faq (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
27
Id. Perverted Justice often works more directly with law enforcement, providing
volunteers to lure predators into official stings under police supervision. Id. Many of the
stings documented by To Catch a Predator segments followed this model. PervertedJustice.com, Info for Police, http://www.perverted-justice.com/?pg=policeinfo (last visited
Jan. 31, 2010).
28
See, e.g., Dateline NBC: To Catch a Predator III, supra note 7.
29
See, e.g., id.
30
See Perverted Justice Foundation Incorporated, http://www.pjfi.org/ (last visited Jan.
31, 2010).
31
See CorporateSexOffenders.com, http://www.corporatesexoffenders.com/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2010).
32
See How to Deal with Creepy People, http://www.howtodealwithcreepypeople.com/
ihtm.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
33
Wikisposure Project, Main Page, http://www.wikisposure.com/Main_Page (last visited
Feb. 20, 2010).
25
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as to whether Perverted Justice is the correct group to offer such services, or
whether law enforcement would be better suited to doing so.34
C. TO CATCH A PREDATOR CONTROVERSY

In addition to the general controversy surrounding Perverted Justice,35
Dateline: To Catch a Predator has itself been the focus of at least two
multi-million dollar lawsuits stemming from its stings.
1. Bartel v. NBC Universal, Inc.36
Until December 2006, Marsha Bartel was a producer employed by
NBC Universal (NBC), working primarily on Dateline.37 She was fired for
an alleged breach of contract and shortly thereafter filed suit against her
former employer for wrongful termination.38 Although ultimately the suit
was dismissed without any finding of fact, Bartel alleged in her complaint
that she was fired due to complaints about rampant lapses in journalistic
ethics in To Catch a Predator.39 Among other allegations, Bartel claimed
that Dateline producers were not provided with the identities of Perverted
Justice volunteers,40 that Perverted Justice did not provide complete
transcripts to Dateline,41 and that the targets of the To Catch a Predator
stings were “led into additional acts of humiliation . . . in order to enhance
the comedic effect of the public exposure of these persons.”42 Bartell
further alleged that Dateline had breached NBC’s Policies and Guidelines
by paying Perverted Justice “to troll for and lure targets into its sting

34
This Comment does not address these questions, nor does it imply that any laws are
being broken by the Perverted Justice Foundation Incorporated or its members. None of
Perverted Justice’s actions appear to be in bad faith or criminal, though there have been
allegations that some of the material posted on wikisposure.com constitutes defamation.
Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found., Inc., No. CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 101322, at *21 (D. Ariz. Dec. 15, 2008) (granting a motion to dismiss all claims for
jurisdictional reasons, without prejudice with leave to re-file). For an excellent discussion of
the legal propriety of Perverted Justice style vigilantism and its interaction with law
enforcement, see Christopher P. Winters, Comment, Cultivating a Relationship that Works:
Cyber-Vigilantism and the Public Versus Private Inquiry of Cyber-Predator Stings, 57 U.
KAN. L. REV. 427 (2009).
35
See, e.g., Winters, supra note 34.
36
543 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2008).
37
Id.
38
Complaint, Bartel v. NBC Universal, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-2925 (N.D. Ill. May 24,
2007), 2007 WL 1995889.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 4.
41
Id. at 6.
42
Id.
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thereby giving it a financial incentive to lie to and trick targets of its
sting.”43
NBC sought dismissal of Bartel’s suit on contractual grounds. In its
brief, NBC made only one reference, in a footnote, to Bartel’s claims about
egregious lapses in journalistic ethics on To Catch a Predator.44 There,
NBC stated that such accusations were immaterial to the contractual claim
Bartel presented and that the court need not resolve them.45 It also pointed
to numerous awards won by the program but did not address the substance
of Bartel’s allegations beyond calling them “extreme” and pointing out that
“many disagree with her views.”46 The suit was ultimately dismissed for
failure to state a claim, and none of Bartel’s allegations were explored in
court.47
2. Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc.48
The second major To Catch a Predator lawsuit was filed only a few
months after Bartel’s complaint.49 This suit arose from the events of a
Dateline sting in suburban Texas where the combination of police
overzealousness and media fervor had deadly consequences.
In early November 2006, only one month prior to Marsha Bartel’s
discharge, To Catch a Predator ran a sting in Murphy, Texas.50 This sting
went terribly wrong, and the operation is a case study in the pitfalls of
combining media with law enforcement. Dateline initially approached city
manager Craig Sherwood prior to the sting and proceeded with his
blessing.51 Other than Sherwood’s unilateral approval, the only other
“official” aspect of the sting was the involvement of local police,
spearheaded by Police Chief Billie Myrick.52 As with other To Catch a
43

Id. at 5.
Defendant NBC Universal, Inc.’s Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), No. 1:07-CV-2925 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
25, 2007), 2007 WL 3314895, at *12 n.5.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See Bartel v. NBC Universal, Inc., 543 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2008).
48
536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
49
Id.
50
John Council & Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, We Are in the Law Enforcement Business,
Not Show Business, TEX. LAW., Nov. 13, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR 25573194.
51
Associated Press, DA Refuses to Prosecute ‘Catch a Predator’ Cases, MSNBC.COM,
June 28, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19486893/.
52
The Murphy police department had run a prior sting with the assistance of Perverted
Justice, but absent Dateline camera crews. This sting netted four arrests and appears to have
been executed without incident. Press Release, City of Murphy, Tex., Follow-up Press
Release Issued by Police Chief Billie Myrick (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
44
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Predator stings, Perverted Justice volunteers posed as minors and, after
allowing alleged online predators to contact them and initiate sexual chats,
provided their targets with an address.53 Over the course of four days,
twenty-four individuals arrived at the Murphy sting house, were
interviewed on camera by Hansen, and were subsequently arrested by
Murphy police.54
After the sting was completed, Dateline and the Murphy police set
their sights on an individual who did not show up at the sting house, Louis
“Bill” Conradt, Jr.55 Dateline alleged that Conradt attempted to solicit a
Perverted Justice volunteer posing as a thirteen-year-old boy.56 The
producers were interested in Conradt because of his role as an assistant
district attorney in neighboring Rockwall County and the sensational aspect
his arrest would provide the program.57 In later litigation, it was alleged
that Hansen asked police for a “favor,” stating, “[i]f he won’t come to us,
we’ll go to him.”58 Local police arranged for arrest and search warrants,
signed by a local magistrate, for Conradt and his home.59
On November 5, Murphy police converged on Conradt’s Kauffman
County home with Dateline cast and crew in tow.60 After knocking on
Conradt’s door and receiving no response, they called in a S.W.A.T. team
who entered Conradt’s home and announced their presence.61 The
S.W.A.T. team found Conradt standing at the end of a hallway, where he
told them, “‘I’m not gonna hurt anyone,’” then shot himself with a
handgun.62 At this point, a police officer informed Hansen, on camera, that
Conradt had shot himself.63 Another officer was videotaped on the scene
telling a Dateline producer that “‘[t]hat’ll make good TV.’”64 Bill Conradt
died from his self-inflicted gunshot wound within an hour.65
The fallout from the Murphy sting was swift and far-reaching. On
November 5, before Conradt’s suicide, the Murphy Messenger was already
http://www.murphymessenger.com/articles/466/1/Follow-up-Press-Release-Issued-byPolice-Chief-Billie-Myrick.html.
53
Id.
54
Council & Sapino, supra note 50.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Associated Press, supra note 51.
58
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 387.
64
Id.
65
Id.
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running an article describing the anger of local citizens stemming from the
Dateline sting.66 One Murphy resident said, “This isn’t about getting sexual
predators off the streets of Murphy. To the contrary, we are inviting them
to come and visit. This is about ratings for a television show and publicity
for a small town police department. I’m disgusted, just disgusted.”67 When
asked for comment, Murphy Mayor Bret Baldwin stated that he was not
forewarned about the sting and that it was never discussed by the city
council.68 When Baldwin approached the city manager, Sherwood told him
that “[a]nyone who interferes with the police investigation in any way will
be arrested.”69
Within a week, Mayor Baldwin issued a press release condemning the
sting.70 Baldwin contended that the sting was unnecessary to apprehend
predators because “[i]n Texas, the law is broken when a minor is solicited
online, not when the meeting occurs.”71 According to section 33.021(c) of
the Texas Penal Code,
[a] person commits an offense if the person, over the Internet, by electronic mail or
text message or other electronic message service or system, or through a commercial
online service, knowingly solicits a minor to meet another person, including the actor,
with the intent that the minor will engage in sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or
72
deviate sexual intercourse with the actor or another person.

Under that law, there is no legal reason to lure suspected predators to a
specific location—the crime of solicitation is complete without any action
or true intent to act to meet offline.73
According to Mayor Baldwin, the purpose behind the procedures
employed by the show and the police working for it was that,
66

Murphy Rolling Ridge Residents Angered by NBC Dateline Sting Operation, MURPHY
MESSENGER, Nov. 5, 2006, http://www.murphymessenger.com/articles/456/1/MurphyRolling-Ridge-Residents-Angered-By-NBC-Dateline-Sting-Operation.html.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Press Release, Mayor Bret Baldwin (Nov. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.murphymessenger.com/articles/467/1/Press-Release-Issued-by-Mayor-BretBaldwin.html.
71
Id.
72
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.021(c) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The act defines “minor” as
“(A) an individual who represents himself or herself to be younger than 17 years of age; or
(B) an individual whom the actor believes to be younger than 17 years of age.” Id.
§ 33.021(a)(1). The Perverted Justice volunteer no doubt qualified as either or, more likely,
both (A) and (B).
73
Section 33.021(d) sets forth that “[i]t is not a defense to prosecution under subsection
(c) that: (1) the meeting did not occur; (2) the actor did not intend for the meeting to occur;
or (3) the actor was engaged in a fantasy at the time of the commission of the offense.” TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.021(d).
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“[u]nfortunately for the citizens of Murphy, a sting operation provides a
more photogenic set” for To Catch a Predator.74 Mayor Baldwin went on
to excoriate the city manager and police chief: “Using our community as a
stage for Dateline NBC, without knowledge or consent of Council, was
inappropriate and it demonstrates a serious lack of judgment . . . .”75
In the months after To Catch a Pretator left, Murphy saw a flurry of
news stories about Conradt’s death.76 Conradt’s boss, District Attorney
Galen Sumrow, was particularly critical of the November 5th arrest
attempt.77 One story quoted Sumrow as stating: “‘This guy comes to work
every morning at about 7:30. They could have arrested him in the parking
lot. . . . I question the methodology they used. . . . Were they really doing
it for law enforcement purposes, or were they doing it for reality TV?’”78 In
essence, the opportunity to arrest Conradt without creating a dangerous
situation existed, but the police opted to forgo it in order to produce more
dramatic television.
The Murphy, Texas episode of To Catch a Predator aired on February
20, 2007.79 The majority of the episode, as edited, was devoted to the sting
itself, but nearly a third of the program focused on the botched attempt to
arrest Conradt.80 Conradt’s sister, Patricia, was shown in the closing
footage of the segment.81 In it, she railed against the “reckless actions [of] a
self-appointed group acting as judge, jury, and executioner . . . [which] was
encouraged by an out-of-control reality show.”82
On June 1, 2007, Collin County District Attorney John Roach released
a terse statement to the press indicating that he was unable to prosecute any
of the individuals arrested in Collin County during the To Catch a Predator
sting.83 He was unable to do so because Collin County had no jurisdiction

74

Press Release, Mayor Bret Baldwin (Nov. 13, 2006) available at
http://www.murphymessenger.com/articles/467/1/Press-Release-Issued-by-Mayor-BretBaldwin.html.
75
Id.
76
See, e.g., Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Sting over Child Sex, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at A10; Associated Press, Facing Arrest in Online Sex Sting,
Prosecutor Kills Self, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2006, at C4.
77
Council & Sapino, supra note 50.
78
Id.
79
Dateline NBC: To Catch a Predator, supra note 23.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Collin County, Collin County Update on the Criminal Investigation Regarding the
Murphy, Texas NBC Dateline Program, MURPHY MESSENGER, June 1, 2007,
http://www.murphymessenger.com/articles/625/1/Collin-County-Update-on-the-CriminalInvestigation-Regarding-the-Murphy-Texas-NBC-Dateline-Program.html.
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in sixteen of the cases since the crime—solicitation—was complete long
before either the suspects or decoys were in the county.84 The remainder of
the charges needed to be dropped because neither law enforcement nor
Dateline could guarantee the chat transcripts’ completeness or
authenticity.85 Roach stated that “[i]f professionals had been running the
show, they would have done a much better job rather than being at the beck
and call of outsiders.”86 Shortly after Roach declined to press charges,
Murphy’s city manager was relieved of his duties.87
On July 23, 2007, Patricia Conradt filed suit against NBC on behalf of
her brother’s estate.88 Among many other claims, Conradt sought relief for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.89 NBC
moved to dismiss Conradt’s lawsuit in its entirety, but the § 1983 claims
were upheld.90 In June 2008, NBC settled Conradt’s lawsuit for an
undisclosed sum.91
D. STINGS AND MEDIA: LEGAL ISSUES

Although the producers and creators of To Catch a Predator may
have, at least in part, honorable intentions, the actual execution of the
program leaves much to be desired. As illustrated by the sting in Murphy,
there is a major conflict of interest inherent in using police stings to garner
ratings while enforcing the law—Dateline producers are, first and foremost,
entertainers. The mere existence of a sting house in Texas is unnecessary
under state law; any risks posed by such an action are, therefore, wholly
gratuitous.
While the show was unquestionably successful as
entertainment, it was far less so as a law enforcement tool. As of the filing
of Conradt’s lawsuit, fewer than half of the individuals arrested in
conjunction with Dateline segments had been convicted.92
The procedural flaws inherent in To Catch a Predator may extend far
beyond issues of evidence and jurisdiction. In Hanlon v. Berger93 and

84

Associated Press, supra note 51.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
89
Id. Conradt also sought relief for individual claims unrelated to her brother’s estate, as
well as a RICO claim, all of which were dismissed. Id. at 387-88, 400.
90
Id. at 400.
91
Brian Stelter, NBC Settles with Family that Blamed a TV Investigation for a Man’s
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at C3. Conradt had initially sought $105 million in
damages. Id.
92
Id.
93
526 U.S. 808 (1999).
85
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Wilson v. Layne,94 the Supreme Court held that inviting media into a home
to observe and document the execution of an arrest or search warrant is a
Fourth Amendment violation.95
While no To Catch a Predator producer or cast member has ever been
invited to a “media ride-along” during the execution of a warrant, the show
came dangerously close to doing so in Murphy.96 There, Dateline
producers were on Conradt’s property during the execution of the search
and arrest warrants.97 Hanlon and Wilson deal with instances in which
media were brought into a private home during the execution of a search
warrant; the cases do not address trespassing on property outside a home.98
Should liability attach under Hanlon and Wilson, it may extend beyond law
enforcement personnel to the media participants themselves.99 Such an
extension of liability is likely to raise the profile of the litigation, placing
law enforcement actions on a national stage.100 It seems apparent that the
onus falls upon law enforcement to ensure that both their actions as well as
the actions of their media collaborators are legally sound.
Beyond possible § 1983 liability for bringing the media into a
suspect’s home, there is also the specter of liability for bringing suspects to
the media. In Lauro v. Charles, the Second Circuit held that the thencommon practice of a “perp walk” violates a suspect’s Fourth Amendment
rights.101 In Lauro, the police had brought a suspect into custody and, hours
94

526 U.S. 603 (1999).
Id. at 614 (“[I]t is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of
the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when the
presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”). In
Hanlon and Wilson, the plaintiffs’ recovery under § 1983 was barred because, at the time the
search warrants were exercised, the law on media observers in such situations was unclear
and the police and media were therefore afforded qualified immunity from monetary
damages. Hanlon, 526 U.S. 808; Wilson, 526 U.S. 603.
96
Dateline personnel trespassing on Conradt’s property were cited in Conradt as part of
the district court’s decision not to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983 complaint. Conradt v. NBC
Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In fact, Hanlon and Wilson
formed the basis of Conradt’s § 1983 claim. Id. at 389-90.
97
Id. at 386.
98
Hanlon, 526 U.S. 808; Wilson, 526 U.S. 603. It is also worth noting that in neither
Hanlon nor Wilson were there allegations of journalists actively participating in the
investigation (as is the case with To Catch a Predator stings).
99
For this very reason, Patricia Conradt’s suit against NBC was allowed to proceed
under § 1983. Conradt, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 389 n.4 (“A private individual may be subject to
liability under [§ 1983] if he or she willfully collaborated with an official state actor in the
deprivation of the federal right.” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 98 (2d
Cir. 1983)) (alteration in original)).
100
This is clear from the media attention paid to the Murphy, Texas sting. See, e.g.,
Stelter, supra note 91.
101
219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
95
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later, when informed of media interest in the case, paraded the suspect
before their cameras “in a manner designed to cause humiliation to [the]
plaintiff with no legitimate law enforcement objective or justification.”102
There is some question as to whether the publicity afforded to stings such as
those seen on To Catch a Predator would be viewed as having a legitimate
law enforcement objective, especially in instances in which the stings
underlying the programs are neither legitimate nor necessary to apprehend
suspected criminals.103 In cases like the Murphy sting, where police had
neither a reason to operate a sting nor jurisdiction to do so, the issue seems
clearer.104
Beyond the pitfalls of media involvement in police stings of this
nature, law enforcement should be mindful of the state of the underlying
law in its jurisdiction. In Indiana, for instance, two recent appellate
decisions have invalidated the felony convictions of accused pedophiles
caught via stings similar to those employed by Dateline and Perverted
Justice.105 In both of these cases, the courts interpreted Indiana’s statute
governing sexual misconduct with a minor106 to require that the target of
such misconduct be an actual minor, precluding a conviction for this crime
based upon a sting operation involving adults posing as minors.107
Although the stings in these cases were operated solely by law enforcement,
they illustrate a need to examine carefully the applicable law. A television
102

Lauro v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 2d 351, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
In Lauro, the Court noted that the suspect was brought before the media after his
arrest rather than the media being present during the arrest itself. Lauro, 219 F.3d at 213.
The court did not address media-captured arrest made under especially media-friendly
circumstances. Cf. id.
104
This is not to say that such a situation would necessarily be viewed as inappropriate in
light of § 1983. In Caldarola v. County of Westchester, a district court found for the
defendant law enforcement officers who videotaped the arrest and transport of a suspect and
later disseminated the tape to the media. 142 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). There, the
court ruled that the police had a legitimate interest in transporting the suspect and that the
videotaping was not a seizure to be examined in light of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 438.
In the case of the Murphy, Texas sting, it is difficult to argue that police had legitimate
reasons to conduct the sting given that the crime was complete at the time of the alleged
solicitation and that the police could have easily tracked down the suspects and arrested them
in other locations (as evidenced by the Conradt fiasco).
105
Gibbs v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), transfer denied, 915 N.E.2d
990 (Ind. 2009); Aplin v. State, 889 N.E.2d 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), transfer denied, 898
N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 2008). In both cases, the charge of attempted sexual misconduct with a
minor was overturned, but the lesser offense of child solicitation was upheld because, for
solicitation, “the statutory criteria with regard to age is satisfied if either the solicitee is at
least fourteen but less than sixteen or the solicitor believes that a child of fourteen but less
than sixteen was the object of his solicitation.” Aplin, 889 N.E.2d at 885.
106
IND. CODE § 35-42-4-9 (2009).
107
Gibbs, 898 N.E.2d 1240 at 1245; Aplin, 889 N.E.2d at 885.
103
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show, whose primary goal is to garner ratings, does not share this
obligation; it must be fulfilled by police and prosecutors.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY
Beyond the obvious harm to society of allowing a child predator to go
free or serve only a partial sentence due to a botched sting, programs like
To Catch a Predator may have much further reaching consequences for our
communities.
Current psychological research suggests that public
willingness to cooperate with police is predicated, in part, on a perception
of the police as legitimate.108 This perception is derived primarily from the
view that the actions of law enforcement are procedurally fair.109 Studies
have further shown that when crimes oppose a moral mandate, people judge
procedures to be considerably fairer when they lead to a conviction than
when they lead to an acquittal.110
To Catch a Predator poses a unique problem for law enforcement
seeking to maintain a credible appearance of procedural fairness. The
program is, at best, procedurally questionable—at worst, it may be outright
illegal—yet it presents itself as procedurally fair.111 One can easily
envision a situation in which viewers interested in the show’s procedures
and fairness will learn about To Catch a Predator’s various controversies
and see law enforcement’s participation as unacceptable, while viewers
oblivious to the show’s procedures will nonetheless view subsequently
publicized legal procedures stemming from sting arrests as unfair when
they do not result in convictions. This is a lose-lose situation for law
enforcement: both groups viewing the show may ultimately view police and
prosecutors as less legitimate, which may have far reaching
consequences.112
108

See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 1; Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 2.
TYLER, supra note 1, at 104.
110
See, e.g., Elizabeth Mullen & Linda J. Skitka, Exploring the Psychological
Underpinnings of the Moral Mandate Effect: Motivated Reasoning, Group Differentiation,
or Anger?, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 634 (2006).
111
To Catch a Predator outlines its procedures at the beginning of each segment; these
outlines are brief, make no mention of any of the procedural controversies surrounding the
show, and could just as well be describing a far more procedurally robust law enforcement
action. E.g., Dateline NBC: To Catch a Predator III, supra note 7.
112
A low conviction rate for suspects caught on television may also impact the public
perception of the law’s moral credibility. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 135-212 (2008); Paul H.
Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice
Policy, 81 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 18-31(2007); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice
(forthcoming 2010) (abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470905). This credibility
is founded on the law’s ability to do justice (as defined by the public’s intuition of deserved
punishments). Robinson & Darley, supra. When the law is viewed as providing too little—
109
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A. LEGITIMACY AND COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT

Social psychologists define and measure legitimacy as the property of
an authority “that leads those connected to it to believe that is appropriate,
proper, and just.”113 Numerous studies have shown that as the legitimacy of
law enforcement increases, the propensity for individuals to follow the law
and cooperate with law enforcement increases.114
These studies, however, do not mean that only legitimate authorities
will be followed. To the contrary, experimental studies have made it
abundantly clear that individuals may be coaxed into any number of acts by
an actor who is perceived to have authority, even if that authority does not
derive from legitimacy.115 In the infamous Milgram experiment, study
subjects were convinced to administer what they believed to be
progressively more painful and, ultimately, lethal electric shocks to another
person.116 These shocks were administered ostensibly as part of an
experiment on memory, and a large number of participants continued to
administer shocks with considerably less prompting than was expected for
such an act.117 In all, 65% of participants continued with the experiment
through the most severe shock level, and no participants refused to continue
before the “Intense/Extreme Intensity” shock range.118 Despite the fact that
the experimenters had no actual authority to cause such harm, their requests
were, by and large, followed.119 Clearly, the absence of actual authority is
or too much—punishment to offenders, the public perception of the law as morally credible
may be reduced. Id. This reduction in moral credibility can create a host of utilitarian
consequences for law enforcement, including vigilantism and a lack of cooperation with law
enforcement. Id. This Comment does not address these problems, as they may occur any
time law enforcement activities are publicized prior to a final judgment of guilt or innocence.
Whenever the public is led to believe a guilty person fails to receive deserved punishment
(or an innocent receives undeserved punishment), the moral credibility of the law can be
harmed. Absent ex ante controls to ensure that all persons targeted by media-publicized
stings will be judged guilty or editorial control allowing the removal of any persons not
judged guilty, moral credibility is at issue whenever law enforcement actions are broadcast.
The recommendations offered in Part III, infra, may help alleviate reductions in moral
credibility by making the convictions of individuals caught on camera more likely.
113
Tyler, supra note 2, at 376. This definition of legitimacy is notable because it
encompasses both actors who are actually “appropriate, proper, and just” and those who are
merely perceived to be so. Id.
114
See, e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 2; Tom R. Tyler et al., Armed and
Dangerous(?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 457 (2007).
115
See, e.g., Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 371 (1963).
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 376.
119
Id.
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not dispositive of compliance; the perception of legitimacy, even without
actual power or authority, can have a great effect on behavior.120
One proposed explanation of the interaction between increased
perceived legitimacy and increased compliance and cooperation is that
when individuals perceive an authority as legitimate, the “duty to obey
superior orders” replaces personal morality, and legitimate authorities are
given leave to define appropriate and inappropriate behavior.121 This is not,
of course, an axiomatic principle; personal morality may provide a check on
authority, reducing the odds of an individual following an order or law that
individual deems immoral.122
This explanation neatly dovetails with the Milgram experiment.123
There, individuals bowed to perceived authority, subordinating their own
(presumed) moral proclivities against administering electric shocks to
strangers to the “superior orders” of Milgram’s experimenters.124 Given the
intense stress evidenced by Milgram’s participants, it is likely that the
conflict between their own morality and the “superior orders” was great.
This disparity between personal morality and the morality of an order to
continue shocking another person despite protests of pain is one possible
explanation for why a great number of study participants did not continue
with the experiment to completion.125
The tendency for people to follow authorities they believe are
legitimate, as illustrated by the Milgram experiment, can be extended to the
tendency of individuals to follow the law. While the law clearly wields
authority that psychological experimenters do not—in the Milgram
experiment, for example, there was no harm to participants if they ceased to
comply—the perception of the law’s legitimacy informs citizens’

120
The “authority” in Milgram’s experiment was played by a “31-year-old high school
teacher of biology” whose “manner was impassive, and his appearance somewhat stern
throughout the experiment.” Id. at 373. This teacher was dressed in a “gray technician’s
coat.” Id. There may have been a certain amount of legitimacy, as defined above, inherent
in such actors, but it is unlikely that experimenters performing such experiments would be
viewed as legitimate over a long period. This has been borne out in the controversy over
Milgram’s experiment and the wide disapproval of his methodology by modern experimental
psychologists. It is important to note that, as no one has replicated the Milgram experiments
for ethical reasons, the precise interactions of legitimacy and authority illustrated there have
not been empirically tested.
121
HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 16 (1989).
122
Id.
123
See, e.g., Milgram, supra note 115.
124
Id. at 377-78.
125
Id. at 376. While a majority of participants took the experiment to its completion,
nearly a third refused to do so. Id.
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willingness to comply with the law in situations where law’s deterrent
effects are not otherwise felt.126
In a landmark study of Chicago residents, Professor Tom R. Tyler
analyzed the willingness of individuals to comply with various laws127 and
their perceptions of both the Chicago police and the law more generally.128
Individuals surveyed were given similar queries on two separate occasions
and asked to provide information about any police or legal contact they had
between surveys.129 Analysis of the survey responses yielded two important
results: first, higher reported perceptions of legitimacy corresponded to
increased rates of compliance with the law;130 second, perceptions of
legitimacy were tied to the perception that law enforcement procedures are
fair and just.131
Through regression analysis, Tyler was able to determine that
perceived legitimacy exerts an independent influence on frequency of
compliance.132 Further, the survey results suggested that the effects of
legitimacy on compliance are stronger among groups with positive
evaluations of police and court performance.133 Although the reported
personal morality of respondents played a greater role in predicting the
level of compliance with the law, an important second factor was “the
person’s feeling of obligation to obey the law and allegiance to legal
authorities.”134 An individual’s sense of obligation is informed, in large
part, by the perception of both the law and legal authorities as legitimate.135
B. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND LEGITIMACY

Because the perception of law enforcement as legitimate can increase
compliance with the law, thereby reducing criminality,136 one must turn to
126

TYLER, supra note 1, at 270-72.
Id. Specifically, Tyler queried respondents as to whether they “[d]rove over 55 miles
per hour on the highways,” “[p]arked [a] car in violation of the law,” “[m]ade enough noise
to disturb neighbors,” “[l]ittered in violation of the law,” “[d]rove a car while intoxicated,”
and “[t]ook inexpensive items from stores without paying for them.” Id. at 41.
128
Id. at 43-56.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 60.
131
Id. at 104.
132
Id. at 60. Other factors found to be important in influencing compliance are personal
morality, sex, and age. Id. This Comment does not address these factors as they are, by and
large, entirely outside the control of law enforcement.
133
Id. at 58.
134
Id. at 64.
135
Id.
136
It may be argued that compliance with the law is not necessarily a desirable outcome,
especially if the law is imperfect to begin with. Such concerns, however, are tempered by
127
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the question of what informs this perception. One proposed model suggests
that police gain acceptance from the individuals they serve when they
(a) appear to be creating credible threats of arrest, (b) actually control
crime, and (c) fairly distribute their services.137 These three factors—risk,
performance, and distributive fairness—comprise the instrumental model of
legitimacy.138 A competing model to explain the perception of legitimacy is
normative: procedural justice.139 According to this model, the legitimacy of
law enforcement in the eyes of the public is closely tied not to instrumental
factors, but instead to judgments by the public of the fairness of the process
used by law enforcement to make decisions and exercise their authority.140
These competing models have been empirically tested to determine
which more accurately describes the perceptions and responses of the
public.141 In one such examination, participants were questioned about their
interactions with, and opinions of, police as well as their willingness to
cooperate with law enforcement.142 Using regression analysis of the data
collected during this study, researchers found that perceptions of legitimacy
were based primarily on procedural justice and, to a lesser extent,
performance and distributive justice.143 In a second study that surveyed a
similar population, legitimacy was shown to be the driving factor behind
cooperation with law enforcement,144 and as before, legitimacy was based
primarily on procedural justice.145 The data collected in each of these
studies were used to create a latent structural equation to illustrate the
interactions between various social and perceptual factors and compliance
with the law, cooperation with police, and police empowerment.146 As
expected, legitimacy informed all three of the dependant variables, itself

the fact that the compliance garnered by increased perceptions of legitimacy is tempered by
the personal morality of members of the public and is by no means absolute. Id. This
Comment takes no position on the desirability of compliance in the abstract and proceeds
under the assumption that the effectiveness of police in reducing crime and creating secure
communities is, on balance, beneficial.
137
See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 2, at 514.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
See, e.g., id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
“Perceptions of police legitimacy . . . and evaluations of risk . . . predicted citizen
cooperation with the police . . . .” Id. at 529.
145
Id. at 530.
146
Id. at 530-31.
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being determined primarily by procedural fairness.147 These results have
been substantially replicated in other peer-reviewed empirical studies.148
Tyler’s Chicago study also bore out the normative procedural justice
theory of legitimacy.149 Tyler examined the influence of police contacts
between surveys to determine what factors reported about those contacts
influenced changes in perceived legitimacy.150 Tyler found that “[w]hen
people react to their dealings with police officers and judges they focus
their attention sharply on questions of procedural justice.”151 In cases in
which negative outcomes were achieved through interactions with police or
courts, the use of fair procedures mitigates, to a large degree, the negative
perception of law one might expect to arise.152 In contrast, when
procedures were viewed as unfair, noticeable drops in individuals’
estimation of the legal system were associated with negative outcomes.153
The use of increased procedural fairness as a tool to increase the
effectiveness of law enforcement is not without precedent.154 This strategy
has been effectively applied by the U.S. military in its reconstruction efforts
in Iraq, where noncompliance may manifest as acts of terror that take the
lives of both Iraqi civilians and American service personnel. In a 2004
study of Iraqi students, designed to discern the psychological underpinnings
of support for resistance, researchers observed that the lack of perceived
procedural justice on the part of the occupying U.S. forces was a major
contributor to support for armed resistance.155 These findings are reflected
in the military’s 2006 counter-insurgency strategy manual, which
emphasized that the American military must establish a legitimate local
government to secure order.156 The manual further emphasizes that
“illegitimate actions are self-defeating, even against insurgents who conceal
147
Id. at 531. As the study authors note, this measure of procedural fairness is entirely
based upon perception; nothing in the study addresses whether or not law enforcement is
actually acting in a procedurally fair manner, merely whether the public views law
enforcement to be acting in a procedurally fair manner. Id.
148
See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People
Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 250 (2008).
149
TYLER, supra note 1, at 7.
150
Id. at 98.
151
Id. at 104.
152
Id. at 100 (“The cushioning effects of procedural justice are quite robust. In no case
involving fair procedure did effect become less positive as outcomes became more
negative.”).
153
Id.
154
See Ronald Fischer et al., Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students: An
Exploratory Study, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (2008).
155
Id. at 169.
156
HEADQUARTERS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY (2006), available at
http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf.
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themselves amid noncombatants and flout the law.”157 It is notable that one
of the authors of this manual, General David Petraeus, was later appointed
commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, followed by a marked reduction in
violence in the region.158
Domestically, the Judicial Council of California has recently invested
considerable resources into examining public perception of fairness and has
taken an experimental approach to new techniques to increase the public’s
perception of the courts’ fairness by increasing public involvement in
judicial processes.159 Courts have also adopted the findings of procedural
justice research in their move towards increased use of alternative dispute
resolution, resulting in increased satisfaction with the legal system and
greater willingness of participants to defer to the decisions courts impose.160
Because the public perception of procedural fairness in law enforcement is
of such high importance, and given the already great investment made in
increasing perceived procedural fairness among law enforcers, it is vital that
law enforcement view with suspicion activities that may reduce perceived
procedural fairness, taking part only if these activities will truly advance
another important law enforcement goal.
C. THE “MORAL MANDATE EFFECT”161 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS JUDGMENTS

Even when procedures appear to be fair, their outcomes may have a
large effect on ex post judgments of fairness.162 In evaluating legal actions,
individual moralities can play a large role in biasing the public in one
direction or another. When individuals have a strong moral conviction
about a topic, and they view that moral conviction as important to their
identities as moral individuals, the conviction may be termed a “moral
mandate.”163 These mandates may dramatically inform public perceptions
of ideal legal outcomes irrespective of the “correct” legal outcome as set
forth by the judiciary.164 When the outcomes of legal actions implicating

157

Id. at 1-24.
Dexter Filkins, His Long War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009, at MM36.
159
California
Courts,
Programs:
Access
and
Fairness
(2010),
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access/index.htm.
160
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 274 (2d ed. 2006).
161
Skitka & Houston, supra note 3; Skitka & Mullen, supra note 3.
162
Skitka & Houston, supra note 3.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 310. For example, the belief that Elián Gonzáles should remain in the United
States might overshadow legal precedent or important political concerns; if a moral mandate
exists, then whether the court gets its decisions “right” or not may matter less than the
decision itself. Id.
158
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such moral quandaries are consistent with moral mandates, the outcomes
themselves will “validate the procedure’s legitimacy, and could be argued
to lead people to perceive the procedure to be even fairer than they did [preoutcome].”165 This upward legitimization based upon fair outcome is not,
however, likely to be of great magnitude “because there is little motivation
to devote much thought to either outcomes or procedures when morally
mandated outcomes are achieved.”166 Although this upward legitimization
is unlikely to have a large effect on perceptions of legitimacy or fairness,
divergent legally and morally mandated outcomes can have great effects on
these perceptions.167
In a study of the Elián Gonzáles case,168 national random samples were
surveyed before and after the federal government’s raid to collect Gonzáles
and after his eventual return to his father in Cuba.169 It was found that the
strongest predictor of post-raid and post-resolution judgments of procedural
fairness, outcome fairness, and decision acceptance was the strength of
participants’ moral mandates about the situation.170 Pre-raid judgments of
fairness were not predictive of post-raid and post-resolution judgments of
fairness, indicating that many participants actually changed their assessment
of fairness after learning of outcomes that diverged from their moral
mandates.171
In a separate study, this effect was also tested in the abstract, using a
more traditional empirical study design to test the effects of moral mandates
without the possible confounding factors present in the previous real-world
study.172 There, a study vignette outlining a trial but limiting the amount of
information presented to participants was crafted to allow for a cleaner test,

165

Id. at 309.
Id.
167
Id.
168
Elián Gonzáles was a five-year-old found floating off the Florida coast after the boat
he was travelling in capsized, killing most of the other occupants including his mother. The
boat was travelling from Cuba to the United States, where Gonzáles had extended family.
There was a months long custody battle between Gonzáles’s father in Cuba and his extended
family, culminating in an armed raid on his extended family’s home and Gonzáles’s forced
return to Cuba. Id.
169
Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, Understanding Judgments of Fairness in a RealWorld Political Context: A Test of the Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning, 28
PERS. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1419, 1422 (2002).
170
Id. at 1427.
171
Id.
172
Skitka & Houston, supra note 3, at 312. In the initial Elián Gonzáles study, factors
such as media portrayal—for example, the infamous photograph of a screaming Gonzáles
being held at gunpoint—could have had a great effect on perceived procedural fairness even
without any actual moral mandate effect.
166
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though it was less immediately applicable to a specific event.173 By
presenting participants with fictional defendants who were either clearly
guilty, clearly innocent, or who had ambiguous levels of culpability, along
with differing sets of procedurally relevant facts, investigators were able to
compare differences in perceived procedural fairness against the actual
fairness of the scenario presented, and to determine what drove the
estimation of fairness.174
As would be expected in the presence of a moral mandate effect, the
perceived fairness of the vignettes depended far more on the outcome of the
trial than on the propriety of the procedures outlined in the vignette.175
Participants given a story about an apparently guilty defendant found the
trial presented to be fairer if it resulted in a conviction rather than an
acquittal, even in the presence of procedural flaws.176 Conversely, trials
resulting in the acquittal of clearly innocent defendants were seen as more
procedurally fair than those resulting in conviction regardless of the
presence of procedural flaws.177 As predicted by the absence of a moral
mandate, the perceived fairness of trials of ambiguously culpable
defendants was correlated to the presence or absence of procedural flaws.178
These results confirm that when the public is already convinced of the
proper outcome, procedures leading to that outcome will be viewed as more
fair than those leading to an opposing outcome regardless of their actual
propriety.
An additional study has shown that when confronted with outcomes
inconsistent with moral mandates, individuals become less likely to obey
social constraints.179 In this study, researchers first assessed participants’
moral views on abortion (either pro-choice or pro-life) and the strength of
these views in order to determine whether each participant had a moral
mandate on the subject of abortion rights.180 Participants were then
randomly assigned to read either a vignette in which a doctor was tried for
allegedly providing an illegal late-term abortion and convicted or a vignette
in which the same doctor was acquitted.181 Half of the vignettes also

173

By limiting the amount of information presented, investigators can ensure that
participants are all presented with and observe the same facts.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 315.
176
Id. at 322.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations
on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1239 (2008).
180
Id. at 1240-41.
181
Id.
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included procedural flaws that, ideally, would be outcome determinative.182
In addition to replicating the moral mandate investigations seen in prior
studies, the study investigators also tracked whether or not participants stole
the pens they were loaned to use during the survey.183
As expected, the perceived fairness of the trial presented to
participants was, for participants with a moral mandate,184 determined
primarily by the outcome of the trial rather than the presence or absence of
procedural flaws.185 More interestingly, the investigators observed what
they termed a “moral spillover effect,” in which participants exhibited
behavioral consequences of “experiencing a [moral mandate] violation.”186
It was observed that none of the participants who had a pro-choice moral
mandate and read the vignette in which the doctor was acquitted absconded
with their borrowed pen, while 25% of those with the same pro-choice
moral mandate who read the vignette in which the doctor was convicted did
not return their pen.187 For individuals without a moral mandate, a greater
proportion took their borrowed pen when they read a vignette where the
doctor was acquitted than when he was convicted.188 Thus, not only can
outcome inconsistencies increase deviant behavior in the presence of a
moral mandate, consistent outcomes may serve to decrease them.189
Although none of these studies tested the public perceptions of sex
offenders specifically, abstract study of moral mandates tends to suggest
that, when confronted with limited information (as viewers of To Catch a
Predator are) and a seemingly unambiguously guilty defendant (as the
targets of To Catch a Predator are presented to be—even the segments’
titles suggest guilt on the part of those caught by the sting), the eventual

182

Id. at 1241.
“After participants completed all the studies, they were instructed to return their pen
and an envelope containing their material to two clearly labeled, adjacent boxes (one labeled
‘PENS’, the other labeled ‘ENVELOPES’) . . . .” Pens were identical, but numbered
“unobtrusively . . . with ink that was only visible under ultraviolet light. Thus, participants
did not know that their pen was numbered but the experimenter was able to identify missing
pens” and correlate them to participant morality. Id. at 1241.
184
The study population, drawn from the undergraduate student body at a major
Midwestern university, included no individuals with a pro-life moral mandate. Id.
“[D]espite concerted efforts to recruit participants with a pro-life [moral mandate], on the
campus where we conducted the study there were simply too few student volunteers with
pro-life beliefs” to comprise a suitable sample population. Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 1240.
187
Id. at 1242 fig.1.
188
Id.
189
Id.
183
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acquittal of those implicated may erode public perceptions of procedural
fairness.190
D. PROBLEMS WITH THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF THIS MODEL

The application of empirical social science research to real world
situations must be done with an eye towards the limitations of the research
itself. None of the above-cited studies was quantitative; rather, they were
qualitative. They may tell us that a phenomenon exists and much about its
nature, but they are not competent to inform law enforcement of the extent
of the phenomena’s effects. The moral mandate effect, for example, has
been clearly demonstrated in repeated studies, but the degree to which those
carrying moral mandates will discount the procedural fairness of a trial or
police action cannot be accurately discerned from a qualitative study no
matter how compelling. Such studies, while providing convincing evidence
of the presence or absence of the quality or relationship tested, are not
designed to measure its magnitude or strength.
Similarly, although it has been demonstrated that procedural fairness is
the greatest contributor to the perception of law enforcement legitimacy, it
is not the sole contributor, and it should not be focused on to the exclusion
of other instrumental factors. For example, a police department would be
foolish to abandon efforts to increase the likelihood of catching criminals in
favor of efforts to appear more procedurally fair—the studies cited all
examined perceptions of competent police forces.
It is also conceivable that the moral mandate effect itself might cut in
favor of procedurally unfair treatment of sexual predators as a mechanism
by which law enforcers might increase public perceptions of their
legitimacy. Numerous studies have shown that individuals are not always
equanimous in the application of fair procedures.191 In one such study,
university students were asked to outline proper procedures to deal with an
accused rule breaker; the identification of the accused as a classmate or as a
student at another institution had a significant effect on the nature of the
procedures put in place to protect the accused rule breaker.192 This
tendency was characterized as an inclination to provide increased

190

See Skitka & Houston, supra note 3, at 324.
See, e.g., Robert J. Boeckmann & Tom R. Tyler, Commonsense Justice and Inclusion
Within the Moral Community: When Do People Receive Procedural Protections from
Others?, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 362 (1997); Kevin M. Carlsmith, John Monahan &
Alison Evans, The Function of Punishment in the “Civil” Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437 (2007).
192
Boeckman & Tyler, supra note 191, at 371-72.
191
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procedural protections to individuals identified as “in-group” as opposed to
“out-group.”193
In a study examining public perceptions of postconviction civil
commitment of sex offenders, it was found that, contrary to Supreme Court
precedent and due process considerations, the public is inclined to apply
civil commitments to sex offenders in a punitive fashion.194 In 1997, the
Supreme Court held in Kansas v. Hendricks that postconviction civil
commitment was constitutional (it does not violate the Fifth Amendment
prohibition on double jeopardy) because the legislative intent behind the
Kansas act allowing commitments was both incapacitative and
therapeutic.195 It was stated categorically that such a statute, enacted for
punitive reasons, would not pass constitutional muster.196 In his dissent,
Justice Breyer pointed out that the legislative intent relied upon could easily
have been written to mask such a law’s true punitive intentions.197
In order to test the masking referenced in Breyer’s dissent, Carlsmith
et al. conducted an empirical study to examine whether individuals would
apply civil commitment laws in a punitive manner.198 In this study,
participants were presented with a description of the law, as well as a brief
vignette outlining a fictional convict’s crimes, initial sentence, and
likelihood to recidivate.199 Participants were asked whether the fictional
convict presented should be civilly committed after his initial sentence had
run, and their responses were correlated to the divergent facts of the
vignettes provided.200 Unlike the stated legislative intent or the Supreme
Court’s directive, the factors leading participants to favor the civil
commitment of the convicts were the heinousness of the convicts’ crimes
and the sufficiency of the convicts’ sentences.201 Even when presented with
a convict who, participants were informed, had absolutely no probability to
recidivate (and who, therefore, needed neither therapy nor incapacitation),
many chose to commit nonetheless.202 Conversely, convicts who had a high
probability of recidivating but had served an apparently appropriate
sentence were not to be civilly committed.203
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 372.
Carlsmith et al., supra note 191, at 437.
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Id. at 369.
Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Carlsmith et al., supra note 191, at 439.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446-48.
Id.
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Several explanations are possible for such results. First, it is possible
that the lack of a unanimous desire to provide procedurally fair processes is
because sex offenders are viewed as an out-group. If this is the case, it is
also possible that the application of unfair procedures to individuals
identified as sex offenders will not result in the same reduction in perceived
legitimacy. After all, if procedural fairness ceases to be desirable, it is easy
to imagine that a lack of procedural fairness will not result, sui generis, in a
perceived lack of legitimacy.
Another possible explanation for the public’s response to sex offenders
is that it is another type of moral mandate effect, applied prospectively
rather than retrospectively. Just as the moral mandate effect, when applied
to disparate outcomes, can affect perceived procedural fairness, it is likely
that a desired outcome can affect the perceived fairness of procedures being
applied.
While both of these explanations may be possible, neither has been
tested empirically. Even if one or both was true, it still would not obviate
the need for law enforcement to appear to practice fair procedures with sex
offenders. In each of the studies, the tendency to apply procedurally
unsound practices to out-group individuals or sex offenders was neither
unanimous among study participants nor did it suggest that there is no level
of procedural unfairness that would result in the loss of legitimacy.
Nothing about either study indicates that the basic rights of out-group
individuals or sex offenders may be infringed upon with impunity or even
what level of fairness must be present to give relaxed standards.204
It is clear that further research needs to be done before law
enforcement can truly act upon the findings of these studies, but this does
not imply that current research should therefore be ignored. The research
performed thus far is compelling, if not perfectly suited to law enforcement
decision-making, and the findings may be used as a guide for law
enforcement in attempting to improve their standing. If nothing else, the
research points the way to a major pitfall for unwary law enforcers.
IV. APPLICATION TO TO CATCH A PREDATOR AND MEDIA IN GENERAL
Having established that, generally, the procedural fairness of law
enforcement may have a large effect on both public perception of law
enforcement and compliance with the law, it is incumbent upon prosecutors
and police officials to examine their involvement with media. How law
enforcement comports itself when it is directly in the public eye naturally
has an effect on perceptions of law enforcement held by the public. To that
204
Cf. Boeckmann & Tyler, supra note 191, at 374-78.; Carlsmith et al., supra note 191,
at 441-47.
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end, law enforcers need to evaluate their decision to take part in programs
like To Catch a Predator and examine the program itself for procedural
flaws before tying their own departments to its reputation.
A. WHAT ARE THE GOALS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTICIPATION?

First, law enforcement must examine the goals advanced by
participation in programs such as To Catch a Predator or other similar
shows or segments to determine whether these goals are being met or
outweighed by the possibility of a negative public reaction to police or
prosecutorial involvement.
Murphy, Texas Police Chief Billie Myrick, explaining his
department’s participation in the November, 2006 To Catch a Predator
sting, said,
We went out on a mission to arrest bad people that were here to harm the children of
this community. People were coming here because they actually believed that they
were actually talking to a 12- or 13-year-old child. That’s it. No different than any
205
law enforcement mission that we take on every day of the week.

For Myrick, who was fired in May 2008, it may have seemed to be a normal
police operation, but other departments have characterized their
involvement differently.206
Kentucky Bureau of Investigation Commissioner David James
characterized the impetus to participate alongside Dateline as one of
publicity.207 “Most parents think their child is safe at home alone having a
computer in their room and not knowing who they’re chatting with,” he
said. “They don’t think anyone would try and contact their child.”208 The
Dateline stings, he says, prove that underage children are not necessarily
safe online and force people to pay attention to the problem.209
While this may be an admirable goal, as is the apprehension of
individuals who would harm children, it begs the question of whether this
goal is only achievable through participation with To Catch a Predator or
similar shows. Currently, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
statutes criminalizing online solicitation of minors,210 and stings run without
205
Vic Walter, ‘To Catch a Predator’ Police Chief Fired, ABCNEWS.COM, May 29, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=4956588&page=1.
206
Id.
207
Burton Speakman, Seven Arrested in Sting, DAILY NEWS (Bowling Green, Ky.), Oct.
22, 2007, http://www.bgdailynews.com/articles/2007/10/22/news/news1.txt.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, State Laws Used to Prosecute
Online Enticement of Children, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/
PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2835 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
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media participation still garner media attention.211 Therefore, participation
with Dateline or NBC in particular is unnecessary to advance the goals of
law enforcement outlined above.
B. IF LAW ENFORCEMENT SHOULD PARTICIPATE, MUST TO CATCH A
PREDATOR REMAIN PROCEDURALLY DEFICIENT?

The agents of the law generally have routine, controlled contacts with
media outlets in order to maintain a favorable public image.212 The vast
majority of municipal law enforcement agencies employ public information
officers to facilitate the flow of information from the department to the
media and act as spokespersons for the entire police force.213 These
information officers must act as both a conduit through which law
enforcement communicates with the public as well as a public relations
officer, assisting law enforcement in maintaining a positive image.214 The
mere presence of such officers is a tacit recognition of the important role
media plays in the day-to-day operations of a law enforcement agency; as
one officer quipped,
We can use drama to inform the public and still be accurate . . . And if . . . cops [don’t
like] this, then they had better go back to a time when TV didn’t exist; like it or not,
we live in a media/video/showbiz world. We can either understand that and work
215
with it or live in a bubble.

Given the power inherent in media, it is no surprise that law enforcement
agencies are tempted to participate in programs like To Catch a Predator;
ideally, through the show they can quickly disseminate information and
maintain a positive image among the public they serve.
Even if law enforcement is convinced that participation with Dateline
on To Catch a Predator segments is necessary and beneficial to the
211

See, e.g., Jennifer Squires, Teacher Pleads Guilty in Online Sex Sting, OROVILLE
MERCURY REG. (Cal.), Jan. 16, 2009, available at LEXIS. Terry Talbert, Shippensburg Man
Jailed Through Internet Sting, PUB. OPINION (Chambersburg, Pa.), Jan. 22, 2009, available
at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-regional/121620891.html; Office of Attorney Gen., State of Pennsylvania, Attorney General Corbett
Announces Arrest of Internet Predators from Bucks Co. & Ohio; Re-Arrest of Predators in
Lebanon & Montgomery Co. (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/
press.aspx?id=4257.
212
JARRET S. LOVELL, MEDIA POWER & INFORMATION CONTROL: A STUDY OF POLICE
ORGANIZATIONS & MEDIA RELATIONS 7 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/197060.pdf.
213
Id. at 105 (“[Eighty-nine percent] of municipal law enforcement agencies have an
employee whose primary responsibility is to serve as a media public information officer.”).
214
Id. at 111-12.
215
Id. at 179. (quoting an unnamed public information officer interviewed by the author)
(alterations in original).
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community, it must recognize that between the competing goals of publicity
and law enforcement the latter must come first for law enforcers. As has
been demonstrated empirically, a focus on high-profile media events at the
expense of fair procedure may have the simultaneous effect of eroding the
public perception of law enforcement as legitimate while at the same time
disseminating this negative effect to as broad an audience as is possible.
In order to avoid this, prosecutors and police officers must take a
proactive stance. Despite the presence of cameras, law enforcement is in a
position of power and control over media when media requests law
enforcement participation in programs like To Catch a Predator.
1. The media market is competitive
Dateline: To Catch a Predator is a single program among many in a
cutthroat business. Dateline desires law enforcement participation in order
to lend its shows credibility, and a threat to withhold participation absent
the implementation of robust legal procedures that ensure both fairness and
positive outcomes is unlikely to be met with a great deal of resistance from
the show’s producers. This is especially so given the competitive climate in
the media market; if Dateline refuses to capitulate, law enforcement
participation may be withheld, and the reasoning behind this lack of
participation may be widely publicized on networks that compete with
NBC.
Even with police participation, To Catch a Predator has received
widespread criticism.216 By associating themselves with To Catch a
Predator, law enforcers open themselves to scathing scrutiny for their
related actions.217 Several articles have criticized the Murphy, Texas sting
and police actions taken there—for example, for the decisions to arrest
Conradt in his home, for the use of a S.W.A.T. team to attempt the arrest,
and for the failure to make more efforts to resolve the situation in a
peaceful, albeit less exciting, manner.218
2. To Catch a Predator relies upon secrecy in order to run its stings
In addition to embarrassing NBC and causing it to lose credibility in
its market, a timely release to other media outlets of Dateline’s refusal to
216
See, e.g., Luke Dittrich, Tonight on Dateline this Man Will Die; Nine Months Ago
NBC’s “To Catch a Predator”: Arrived in Murphy, Texas, to Conduct a Sting Operation.
The Only Honest Thing that Followed Was the Gunshot, ESQUIRE, Sept. 1, 2007, at 233;
Melissa Healy, My Pal, My Bully, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at F1 (criticizing To Catch a
Predator for drawing undue attention to the problem of online sexual solicitation at the
expense of the more immediate concern of online bullying).
217
See Dittrich, supra note 216.
218
See, e.g., Council & Sapino, supra note 50.
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act according to law enforcement requirements will ensure that To Catch a
Predator will be unsuccessful in a community. The program relies on
secrecy in order to run its stings; they would doubtless be unsuccessful if
the “predators” they sought to catch were able to learn that a sting was
underway.
One of the hallmarks of the show’s stings is that the predators it
“catches” actually show up to a sting house. Had Murphy District Attorney
John Roach publicized that Dateline was attempting to run such a sting
without the city’s involvement because it refused to implement the district
attorney’s procedural recommendations, the turnout at the sting house
would be dramatically depressed by simple virtue of the fact that the
putative predators would know better than to be enticed to a town in which
they knew a sting was being carried out.
In Texas and states with similar laws governing online solicitation, the
crime of solicitation is complete long before Dateline cameras begin to
roll.219 Despite disruption to Dateline’s sting, the producers of the show
would be hard pressed to argue that a prosecutor was impeding the arrest
and prosecution of online sexual predators. Such allegations would ring
hollow, as there is no legal requirement to have a sting at all—let alone to
have one in any particular community—and the disruption of a sting would
have legal effect.
V. CONCLUSION
While the empirical research cited in this Comment does not indicate
that all law enforcement media interactions are suspect or even that all such
interactions may have a detrimental effect on citizens’ view of law
enforcement legitimacy or their inclination to obey laws of their own
volition, it indicates that there may be a high price to pay for interactions
that demonstrate a lack of procedural fairness. These high costs are,
however, easy for law enforcement to avoid by either declining to
participate in programs like To Catch a Predator or by demanding that, as a
condition of law enforcement participation, the goals of law enforcement
must supersede those of the programs with which police or prosecutors
choose to associate themselves. The goal of bringing attention to law
enforcement efforts to curb online solicitation of minors is an admirable
one, and quite achievable through popular media, but the agents of the law
should consider all possible implications of their actions before deciding to
move forward. As Collin County District Attorney John Roach said in the
aftermath of the Murphy, Texas debacle, “We are in the law enforcement
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business, not show business.”220 Where media goals align with those of law
enforcement, media outlets can provide a valuable tool in the arsenal of law
enforcement; where they diverge, law enforcement goals must be met
before allowing cameras to roll.

220

Council & Sapino supra note 50, at 6.
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